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Book Review  
Janae Sholtz, The Invention of a People: Heidegger and 
Deleuze on Art and the Political (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2015) 
For Gilles Deleuze, writing about a philosopher means uncovering the 
key concepts at work in her philosophical system with the problems to 
which these concepts intend to respond. In Negotiations, Deleuze states that 
“history of philosophy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has 
to say what he must have taken for granted, what he didn’t say but is 
nonetheless present in what he did say” (136). Any book on Deleuze and 
Heidegger must therefore not only put them into dialogue explicitly but 
make their problems (that their concepts were conceived to respond to) 
enter into dialogue. Janae Sholtz exposes some of those problems, especially 
concerning the philosophy of being or ontology, but unfortunately she 
seems to have missed the most urgent problems that Deleuze, sometimes 
with Guattari, was answering. What were these urgent problems? The 
changes in the modes of production with the neoliberalization of the 
economy and society, the crisis of Marxism that they were contributing to 
and responding to, the aftermath of 1968 and the future of revolution in 
Western Europe, left-wing terrorism, the rise of new philosophers, human 
rights, communication and thoughtless media discourse, the withering away 
of the working class identified as the revolutionary agent (the proletariat), 
the emergence of control societies, and so on. Some of Heidegger’s problems 
were “Americanization,” the atomic bomb, cybernetics, and technology, but 
also the decline of traditions and religion. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s wild creation of concepts leads to confusion and 
misreadings, yet the reception of their work is perhaps symptomatic of how 
much can be found in their work. Like Hegel’s work which led to the divide 
between conservative Hegelians and the Young/Left Hegelians, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work has produced a split between right-wing and left-wing 
Deleuzians. Their concepts are used by Right Deleuzians to understand and 
believe in the promises of contemporary neoliberal societies. Neoliberalism 
permits them to “become” and “deterritorialize,” to make themselves a 
“body without organs,” to travel through “smooth spaces,” to accelerate the 
process even further to find “lines of flight” in subsuming and delirious 
activities in the abstract world of financial services. As Deleuze notes so 
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clearly in his definition of the Left in his televised Abécédaire interviews, it is 
not a matter of morality but a matter of perception. On this point, Janae 
Sholtz is right: art, politics and ontology are zones of indistinction where 
forces and perceptions communicate, yet they cannot be extracted from their 
techno-social milieu, the inequalities and injustice to which Deleuzian and 
Guattarian concepts attempt to respond. Yet, the author does not refer to 
justice, inequality, capitalism, the State, power, etc. It is not that Sholtz 
should have written a treatise on political economy instead of this beautiful 
collection of interpretations. However, as I hope to make clear, a book on 
Deleuze (and Heidegger) that deals with “the political” and agency (a 
people) cannot do away with the ontic (or social) level, that is, it cannot do 
away with what Deleuze and Guattari fundamentally opposed. This book is 
important in drawing out the thematic of a people-to-come, and in many 
ways, its starting point is Deleuze’s borrowing of the painter Paul Klee’s 
phrase “We still lack the ultimate power, for: the people are not with us [uns 
trägt kein Volk]. But we seek a people” (Klee quoted at 117). Therefore the 
task of art is to invent the people that is missing (Deleuze write in French “le 
peuple manque”). Yet this appears more as a question rather than as a 
statement. Why are the people missing? And why are artists or philosophers 
those who can invent the people? “Quid facti and quid juris” Deleuze would 
ask, how can they aspire to this task? Where do they get their legitimacy or 
right from? (David Lapoujade recently identified all these questions as the 
guiding thread to Deleuze’s philosophical thought). Minorities can claim the 
right to be the new revolutionary agents, since they have been deprived of 
desires but also of a land, a language, a body, etc. Minorisation is also a 
condition of subjection organized by capital, and not only the new 
revolutionary subjectivity that should be celebrated. It is not that these 
replace the working class as the new proletariat, as certain interpretations 
would have it; they do not have a fixed substance either; they are screams, 
affects and intensities beyond the normalizing state of affairs. 
The main body of Sholtz’s book is a commentary and explanation of 
some of Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s main concepts. Regarding Heidegger, 
the discussions move from poiesis and art as a saving power in relation to 
Gestell and technology (89-112) to the concepts of earth and world that are 
also significantly interpreted (96-106), and connected to Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s own usage of earth in What is Philosophy?. 
The commentary on “The Origins of Work of Art” is extremely 
insightful, especially when the author explains the small changes or 
additions that Heidegger made in the three different versions of the text. 
Earth, enigmatically described as “sheltering,” “does not give itself in terms 
of meanings and significances related to our human endeavors… [it] needs 
the setting-up of world in order to be itself or at least reveal itself” (100). The 
discussions on the cosmic and the planetary are also useful in making sense 
of Heidegger’s vocabulary and in highlighting the misinterpretations of 
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earth, soil and blood. It is by reading carefully the controversial 1934-35 
lectures on Höderlin and the 1933 “Rector’s Address” that Sholtz makes this 
clear: 
If Heidegger is engaging in the politics of enrootedness, it 
is not that of those longing for a nostalgic return to a once 
great past [for instance Ancient Greece or Prussia]; it is 
nothing already present or already known, to be extricated 
or purified, and there is no simple return to an original 
source. (199) 
It is because the polis is a place that unifies social relations that the soil of the 
earth is considered to determine the people (202). But this is also true for 
language, which is also treated as a place (“we are in language” [202]). The 
“task” and the “endowment” are also tied to Heidegger’s notion of people 
[Volk], compared to the “public” that remains tied to “everyday business” 
(209). The author is aware of the difficulty of this terrain, given Heidegger’s 
anti-Semitism and his involvement with National Socialism. It is not that 
Janae Sholtz and Deleuze forgive Heidegger for this involvement, but they 
also recognize the power of his concepts and his thinking. Hence, Deleuze’s 
words are taken by the author as a core element of the Heidegger-Deleuze 
relationship: “He got the wrong people, earth, and blood” (3, 12, 125). 
Heidegger therefore opened up new fields of inquiry in relation to being, art 
and politics, but continued to oppose difference and identity, to presuppose 
a “homology between Being and beings” (218). In short, and by largely 
following Oliver Marchart’s chart about post-foundational political thought, 
we can argue that Heideggerian political thought wants to derive everyday 
politics from the ontological realm (even when this is an abyssal ground), 
while Deleuze thinks we should constantly have access to the ontological as 
virtual (or as transcendental empiricism). In other words, even everyday 
occurrences and catastrophes provide access to the ontological, it is not 
something that is restricted to philosophers or theologians. The author is 
right to emphasize stability and “the unity of difference” in Heidegger, 
which she calls appropriately “metaphysical racism” (219). However, she 
does not distinguish enough between the two thinkers: she would agree 
with the claim that Deleuze is not a post-foundational political thinker, as 
defined by Marchart, but she does not activate sufficiently the potential of 
Deleuze’s political thought for today. Worse still, by emphasizing openness, 
fluidity and multiplicity, she risks essentializing and fixing such positive 
affirmations. As David Lapoujade states: “One should leave behind [défaire] 
the idea that Deleuze had only sung the joyful affirmation of the powers of 
life” (Deleuze: Les Mouvements aberrants, 22). This joy is closely tied to 
dangers and deaths one finds along the way. It is not that ontology comes 
first, but as Deleuze puts it in A Thousand Plateaus, “before Being, there is 
politics.”  
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Sholtz is right to build “conceptual bridge[s]” (128) between Heidegger 
and Deleuze since there are common gestures at play in the way they create 
concepts and use language in new ways in philosophy to pose new 
problems. Deleuze certainly understood philosophy as ontology, a 
transformation realized by Heidegger. Heidegger’s essay “The Age of World 
Picture,” for instance, seems particularly significant for Deleuze’s own 
project of noology (the study of “images of thought” and their historicity). 
Heidegger is interested in what defines the age as “world picture” since by 
using calculative or instrumental reason, modern societies have attempted to 
unleash a drive to dominate the earth, making it an unworldly world. The 
notion of picture is extremely close to what Deleuze means by “image of 
thought,” a “general theory of thinking, a thinking of thought” (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 500). This is not a detail in Deleuze’s philosophy given that Deleuze 
emphasized in his 1986 introduction to the English translation of Difference 
and Repetition, the image of thought precedes the creation of concepts. The 
author rightly notes Deleuze’s explicit references to Heidegger’s lectures on 
thinking, but does not pursue this point to explain the political project 
behind it. Deleuze transforms Heidegger’s own understanding of thinking 
to define what the Left stands for: “The Left really needs… people to 
think”(Negotiations, 128). 
One of the most successful passages in the book is the interlude on Klee, 
and the commentary on the astonishment his paintings produced in 
Heidegger (112-4). A discussion at this point on Deleuze’s own reflections 
on Klee would have been welcome, as well as a comparison with his 
treatment of Francis Bacon, for instance. Another brilliant analysis is given 
by the close reading of the “Six Basic Developments in the History of 
Aesthetics” (33-37) from Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, which brings 
great insights into Heidegger’s own understanding of the relationship 
between art and aesthetics from a historicist point of view. Generally, the 
first two chapters of the book on Heidegger’s Nietzsche and Deleuze’s 
Nietzsche are very useful, in comparing their two interpretations and the 
consequences for their respective ontologies. A beautiful analysis of 
active/reactive forces from Nietzsche and Philosophy is given in chapter 2 (55-
61), yet the larger political consequences of this are not drawn (for instance, 
the parallel between power and potential, pouvoir and puissance in Foucault 
and Negri). Nor does the author see in the commentary of the “Origin and 
Reversed Image” section of Nietzsche and Philosophy (60), the main question 
Deleuze had for Nietzsche: “how do reactive forces triumph?” Deleuze 
responds by arguing that reactive forces dominate by “subtraction”, by 
separating active forces from what they can do. 
Even though she distances herself from the knotty problem of ideology 
critique, Sholtz is aware of the role of fiction, simulacra and the powers of the 
false, especially when she draws the useful distinction between Heidegger’s 
usage of myth as a way to pass from art to politics, and Deleuze’s own 
1 4 4  |  B o o k  R e v i e w  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIII, No 2 (2015)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2015.702 
tentative explanation of the role of fabulation in politics. Myth and 
fabulation are two distinct ways to draw together territory and earth (238). 
Kant is rightly convoked in the analysis of Deleuze’s theory of sensation and 
perception (or percept), yet Kant could have also functioned as a 
“conceptual bridge” (much like Nietzsche or Klee) to map out the 
differential relations of a Deleuzian Kant and a Heideggerian Kant. The 
“plateau” on Axelos is less successful since there is no real engagement with 
Kostas Axelos’ concepts (and his book on Marx and technology is his most 
famous) and the prolongation of those in Heidegger and Deleuze. He also 
disappears as quickly as he appears in the text, unlike Klee whose recurrent 
intervention really helps the progression of the argument. Another omission 
is the important essay “What is a Creative Act?,” which is one of the few 
texts where Deleuze refers to control societies; this makes it a crucial essay to 
understand the passage from art to politics in his later political thought. 
Why is art the privileged passage to politics? Quid juris? Neoliberal 
societies already function on the aestheticization of life, resulting from a 
certain conditioning of capitalism and elite forces. We have been turned into 
consuming machines that are devoid of resistance to the present, even 
worse, our own resistance is most often used to fuel the very machine that 
these resistances attempted to short-circuit. Deleuze and Guattari’s thought 
have therefore been interpreted as being not only compatible with 
capitalism but precisely its very motor (by Boltanski and Chiapello, or by 
Žižek amongst many others). But these readings are often not patient 
enough, and they do not see that Deleuze and Guattari’s own concepts, for 
instance deterritorialization, were made in relation to the immanent problem 
of capitalism itself. Capitalism and schizophrenia are two different kinds of 
limits (respectively, the relative and the absolute limits); they differ with 
respect to how they integrate desires as part of the “axiomatic,” one delirium 
can be subsumed but not the other. To aestheticize oneself is what everyone 
does in post-2008 neoliberal societies (through Facebook or Instagram to 
network, and through LinkedIn to find jobs), aesthetics has become entirely 
integrated with capitalism, but this does not mean that art no longer has a 
role to play. Contrary to these loud interpretations, Deleuze pre-empted 
these criticisms in his famous short essay “Societies of Control” (1990), 
where he writes powerfully: “Many young people have a strange craving to 
be ‘motivated’,” or “[w]e’re told businesses have souls which is surely the 
most terrifying news in the world.” 
Benoît Dillet 
University of Freiburg  
